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JURISDICTION 
Respondent Pine Meadow Ranch Home Owners Association (the "Association") 
agrees with the statement of jurisdiction contained in the Petitioner's Opening Brief.1 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A writ of certiorari was granted as to a single issue only: 
Whether Deseret Diversified Development had the 
authority as a beneficial owner to impose binding covenants, 
conditions and restrictions. 
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS 
Issue No. 1: Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-102 (2000); Utah Code Ann. § 57-4a-2 (2000); Jacobs 
v. Hafen, 875 P.2d 559 (Utah App. 1994); Capital Assets Financial Services 
v. Maxwell, 994 P.2d 201 (Utah 2000); Flying Diamond Oil Corporation v. 
Newton Sheep Company, 776 P.2d 618 (Utah 1989). 
Issue No. 2: Utah Code Ann. § 57-4a-4 (2000); Cronquist v. Utah State Agr. College, 114 
Utah 426, 201 P.2d 280 (1949); Swenson v. Erickson, 998 P.2d 807 (Utah 
2000). 
Issue No. 3: Rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure; Rule 8.2 of the Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct. 
1
 Petitioner Forest Meadow Ranch Property Owners Association, LLC, though 
confusingly denominated as an association of property owners, is the owner of a single lot. 
Perhaps to avoid confusion with other, similarly named entities, the lower Courts consistently 
referred to it as "Petitioner," and that reference will continue here. Petitioner has a single 
member, Axel Grabowski. (Opinion, f l 1.) 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Petitioner filed this action six years ago in an effort to avoid paying an annual 
assessment of $175 made by the Association, a homeowners' association authorized by 
30-year-old Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for the Forest Meadow Subdivisions 
recorded in Summit County in 1971 ("CC&Rs"). The action sought to nullify the CC&Rs, 
which Petitioner termed "wrongful liens" against its property. 
Petitioner is the owner of Lot 105 A in the Forest Meadow Subdivision, Plat D. It 
acknowledges that Deseret Diversified Development ("Deseret") recorded the CC&Rs "to 
provide for a mandatory home owners' association with power to make assessments and 
impose liens" against a large tract of real property in Summit County, Utah. (R. 0023-26.) 
Petitioner admits having both constructive and actual notice of the CC&Rs (R. 00167-68), 
and further admits that it took title to Lot 105A "subject to easements, restrictions and right 
of way currently of record, and general property taxes for the year 1998 and thereafter." 
(R. 00206.) Nevertheless, even though it has enjoyed the benefits of the Association, 
Petitioner claims the CC&Rs are not binding as against its property. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Shortly after taking title to Lot 105 A, Petitioner filed a petition under the summary 
procedures of Utah's Wrongful Lien Statute, Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-9-1, et seq., seeking to 
nullify a 1980 Lien Notice recorded by the Association. (R. 0001-0007.) Its effort was 
rejected by the district court and Petitioner filed an amended petition asking for an order 
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declaring that the 1980 Lien Notice was a "wrongful lien" and that the CC&Rs were invalid. 
On that basis, Petitioner argued that it should not be required to pay the Association's modest 
annual assessments. (R. 0102-04.) Petitioner's request for summary reliefwas again denied, 
but it was allowed to proceed with its claims on a non-summary basis. The parties later filed 
cross-motions for summary judgment agreeing on the material facts and urging the trial court 
to resolve these issues as a matter of law. (R. 00215-16; 217-19.) The district court entered 
a lengthy ruling denying Petitioner's motion and granting Respondent's motion on multiple, 
alternative grounds. (R. 00366-82.) Petitioner then filed a "Second" motion for summary 
judgment that was also denied by the trial court. (R. 00490-92.)2 
In April 2003, the district court entered judgment in favor of Respondent and against 
Petitioner, effectively validating the CC&Rs. (R. 00493-97.) Thejudgment decreed (1) that 
the CC&Rs were properly filed and properly encumber Lot 105 A; (2) that the burdens and 
benefits of the CC&Rs run with the land and have done so for thirty years and, as a result, 
Petitioner's challenge to the CC&Rs is untimely; (3) that since Petitioner bought its lot with 
notice of the CC&Rs and acquired title subject to them, it would be inequitable for Petitioner 
not to comply with them; and (4) that the CC&Rs and the 1980 Lien Notice are not wrongful 
liens against Petitioner's property. (R. 00493-97.) 
2
 The court ruled consistently in a companion case Paul Howard Peters vs. Pine 
Meadow Ranch Home Association, which was also affirmed by the Court of Appeals, Case 
No. 200403 96-C A, in an unreported decision. This Court granted a writ of certiorari in that 
matter, Case No. 20050806-SC, on the identical issue presented here. The Association's 
brief in Peters is filed contemporaneously herewith. 
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Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, after briefing and oral argument, 
issued a unanimous opinion on June 30, 2005. The Court of Appeals held that the CC&Rs 
had been adequately subscribed and imparted notice of their existence (Opinion, pp. 19-23), 
that the facts submitted to the trial court offered sufficient evidence that Security Title held 
the property in question in trust for interests that ultimately devolved to Deseret Diversified 
Development, see id. at 24-30, that sufficient privity of estate existed that the CC&Rs run 
with the land, see id. at 31-35, that Security Title ratified the recording of the CC&Rs by 
joining in the subdivision of the lots and thereafter conveying the lots subject to the CC&Rs, 
see id. at 36, that the doctrine of uniformity argued by Petitioner has not been adopted in 
Utah (and that Petitioner did not allege facts sufficient to warrant an examination of the 
doctrine), see id. at 37, and that the 1980 Notice of Lien filed by Respondent merely 
republished the CC&Rs, see id. at 38. 
Petitioner asked for rehearing on July 12, 2005 because of a mischaracterization by 
the Court of the role of W. Brent Jensen as president of Security Title. The Court of Appeals 
denied the Petition for Rehearing on July 20,2005, apparently because Security Title actively 
participated in the development of the subdivision and thereby authorized the structure of the 
development, regardless of who signed for it. This development structure included the 
recorded CC&Rs, subject to which Security Title transferred title to the platted lots. 
A Petition for Writ of Certiorari was then filed by Petitioner, seeking review of the 
decision of the Court of Appeals on eight separate grounds. The Petition was granted as to 
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a single issue only: "Whether Deseret Diversified Development had the authority as a 
beneficial owner to impose binding covenants, conditions and restrictions." The issue, as 
defined by this Court, assumes that Security Title held legal title in its capacity as trustee to 
the land that later became Lot 105 A, and that Deseret held beneficial title to that land at the 
time the CC&Rs were recorded. In its Opening Brief, however, Petitioner challenges the 
basis for that assumption and wanders beyond the grant of certiorari, including arguments 
on the nature of trusts generally, ratification and agency, and the statute of frauds. The 
Association believes these arguments are in the nature of a plenary appeal, beyond the issues 
fairly encompassed by the order granting certiorari. 
Statement of Facts 
L The Association was established August 14, 1973, by Brent Jensen and 
Vincent B. Tolmann to act as the owners' association for the Pine Meadow Subdivisions 
located in Summit County, Utah. (R. 00244.) 
2. Petitioner is a Utah limited liability company established in December 1999 by 
Axel Grabowski. (R. 0160-61.) He is its sole member. 
3. Petitioner is the owner of Lot 105 A, Plat D, Forest Meadow Subdivision, by 
virtue of a 1999 Quit Claim Deed from Axel Grabowski recorded by the Summit County 
Recorder's Office. (R. 0134; Opinion f 11.) 
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4. Petitioner's chain of title for Lot 105A was described by the Court of Appeals 
at paragraphs 2-11 of the Opinion. That sequence of deeds and dates is acknowledged by all 
parties. 
5. Petitioner acquired title to Lot 105A "subject to easements, restrictions and 
right of way currently of record, and general property taxes for the year 1998 and thereafter." 
(R. 00207-08.) 
6. Brent Jensen and his companies, including Deseret were the developers of the 
Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow subdivisions in Summit County. (R. 00244; Opinion^ 3, 
4, 5, 36.) 
7. Over twenty years ago, this Court described Brent Jensen and his companies 
as the developers of the Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow subdivisions. See Leo M. 
Bertanole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 639 P.2d211,212 (Utah 1981) (noting that in 1970 
"Brent Jensen, a defendant, bought acreage north of Tollgate Canyon for development 
purposes . . . . By January 1, 1975, 380 mountain lots had been sold in areas served by 
Tollgate Road, including Jensen's Forest Meadow Ranch and Pine Meadow Ranch 
subdivisions"). 
8. On July 22, 1971, Deseret recorded the CC&Rs, entitled "Reservations and 
Restrictive Covenants, Forest Meadow Ranch," dated July 8, 1971, as entry No. 113593, 
Book No. M32, Pages 251-254, in the office of the County Recorder of Summit County. 
(R. 0023-26; Opinion % 4.) 
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9. The CC&Rs were signed for Deseret, a Utah Corporation, by W. Brent Jensen, 
its president. (R. 0023-26.) They plainly recite that the CC&Rs are established by Deseret, 
"the owner of the foregoing described premises . . . ." (Id.) (Emphasis added.) 
10. A couple of weeks later, on August 19, 1971, Deseret rerecorded the original 
CC&Rs as Entry No. 113788, Book No. M32, Pages 590-93, in the of the office of the 
County Recorder of Summit County, to correct an obvious but incorrect description of the 
property. (R. 00475-478; Opinion^ 19.) The re-recorded CC&Rs simply corrected the legal 
description from "Township 1 South" to "Township 1 North," and reflect the original 
recording information along with the new. Much of the property that later became the Forest 
Meadow Subdivision Plat D is contained in the property described in the CC&Rs. 
(R. 00475-78.) A copy of the rerecorded CC&Rs is attached as Addendum 2 to Petitioner's 
Brief. 
11. Though recordation of the CC&Rs imparts constructive notice of their 
contents, See Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-3-102, 57-4a-2 (2000), Petitioner had actual notice of 
them. (R. 00167.) 
12. Forest Meadow Ranch Plat D ("Plat D") was recorded with the Summit County 
Recorder on August 9,1972. It was recorded by the stated "owners" of the property, Deseret 
Diversified and Security Title Company, Trustee. (R. 00179; Opinion Tf 5.) A copy of the 
Forest Meadow Plat D is attached as Addendum 3 to Petitioner's Brief. 
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13. Plat D was signed by the beneficial owner, Deseret (by W. Brent Jensen, 
President, and Lee Ann Hunter, Secretary) and by Security Title Company as Trustee. 
(R. 0179.) Each party's signature on the plat acknowledges the ownership status of the other. 
14. Plat D confirms that it was "recorded and filed at the request of Deseret 
Diversified Development Corp." (Id.) 
15. Deseret Diversified was also identified as the subdivider of the land and as an 
owner in the Subdivider's Note, contained on the recorded Plat D. (Id.) 
16. The Forest Meadow Ranch Landowners Association was initially formed as 
the owners' association for the Forest Meadow subdivisions, including Plat D. (R. 00244.) 
On May 30, 1978, the Forest Meadow Ranch Landowners Association was merged into the 
Association by shareholder vote. (R. 00244.) 
17. Since the merger in 1978, the Association has operated as the homeowners' 
association for all of the 800 plus lots, homes, and cabins in the several Pine Meadow and 
Forest Meadow subdivisions. (R. 00245; Opinion j^ 13.) It has conducted its business, 
including exercising architectural control and active enforcement of the CC&Rs since its 
creation.3 
18. Lot ownership has been the basis for membership in the Association, including 
the obligation to assessments and notice of and the right to vote at the Association's annual 
3
 Thus, the validity of the CC&Rs was never "moot," as suggested by Petitioner. 
(Brief, p. 11.) 
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meetings. (R. 00245.) Access to lots within the Association's boundary, including Lot 
105 A, can only be had through the Association's roadways. {Id.) Petitioner has attended and 
voted at Association meetings and has utilized the roadway improvements and other benefits 
provided by Respondent. 
19. To confirm public notice of the various sets of CC&Rs recorded against 
various Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow subdivisions, Respondent republished those 
CC&Rs in the form of the 1980 Lien Notice recorded on July 25,1980, as Entry No. 168800 
in Book 163 at Page 152 of the records of the Summit County Recorder, and therein gave 
notice of an address at which confirmation of payments of any assessments could be 
obtained. (R. 00247; Opinion % 38.) 
20. In response to questions raised in part as a result of this lawsuit, on April 3, 
2003, Respondent recorded the Clarification of Notice of Lien, as Entry No. 653634 in Book 
1523 at Page 1809, confirming that the 1980 Lien Notice was intended merely to republish 
the existing CC&Rs and other encumbrances of record and did not to create a new 
encumbrance on the property. (R. 00247; Opinion ^ 38.) 
21. The Association operated with funds collected by the Pine Meadow Special 
Service District until Summit County determined to dissolve the Special Service District in 
1999. Upon dissolution of the Special Service District, Summit County conveyed to the 
Association an exclusive easement (concurrent with the rights of the local water company) 
for the control, operation, construction and maintenance of the roads in the Pine Meadow and 
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Forest Meadow subdivisions. (R. 258.) The Association has since assessed its members, 
under the authority of its articles of incorporation and by-laws, to pay for the maintenance 
and insurance of the roads and open space, and for other Association purposes. Petitioner 
has refused to pay any assessment made by the Association. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Deseret acted in the role of the developer in imposing, through recorded CC&Rs, a 
structure for a future owners' association, subdividing the land by recording an ownership 
plat, creating the owners' association, and obviously arranging the sales of the lots it created. 
Its authority to do so is amply confirmed by the active collaboration of the legal title holder, 
Security Title Company, Trustee. 
First, Deseret declared its status as an owner in the recorded CC&Rs. It then 
proceeded with the preparation, approval, and recordation of the plat to create the Forest 
Meadow Plat D subdivision. Its roles as owner, subdivider and the parity that recorded the 
plat are expressly stated on the face of the plat. Equally clear on the face of the plat is the 
approving participation of Security Title, Trustee, which signed with Deseret as an owner. 
At the time the plat was signed and recorded, Security Title had notice of the CC&Rs, which 
were already of record. Significantly, the signatures of Security Title and Deseret were 
simultaneously notarized by Deseret's attorney, Lee Rudd, the same individual wrho notarized 
and recorded the CC&Rs. Security Title thereafter conveyed title to the Plat D lots created 
by Deseret to Petitioner's predecessor-in-interest subject to restrictions and reservations 
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appearing of record. All of this contemporaneous evidence confirms that Deseret acted with 
authority in imposing the CC&Rs. 
Petitioner counters by arguing that the law of trusts prohibited Deseret's actions and 
that the Court of Appeals effectively overturned the law of trusts by affirming the Trial 
Court. Petitioner is wrong. The ruling of the Court of Appeals was carefully tailored to the 
uncontested facts of this case. It made no broad pronouncements and overturned no 
precedent. Deseret, the beneficial title holder, never purported to convey fee title to the 
property and did not create a competing chain of title. It did not attempt to convey the 
Trustee's interest in the trust assets. To the contrary, Deseret acted within the scope of its 
beneficial interest as the developer of the property and effected the planned conditions and 
subdivision of the land. Security Title confirmed Deseret's authority to so actbyjoining with 
Deseret in the execution and recording of the plat and then conveying the lots created 
thereby subject to the restrictions of record. 
The other technical issues raised by Petitioner, including ratification and the statute 
of frauds are not within the issue defined by the grant of the writ of certiorari.4 Even if they 
were properly raised herein, however, Petitioner has not shown that the Court of Appeals 
erred. Security Title's joinder with Deseret in the platting process as an owner, and its 
subsequent conveyance of the lots created by Deseret subject to the previously recorded 
4
 Petitioner acknowledges that its ratification argument is beyond the scope of 
certiorari. (Opening Brief at pp. 31-32.) 
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restrictions confirms that Deseret either acted within its existing authority as developer or 
that Security Title ratified Deseret's prior actions. There is no other logical construct of the 
uncontroverted facts. 
Finally, the Association is constrained to note the unjust and scandalous criticism of 
the Court of Appeals and, in particular, of Judge Greenwood, in the Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari and in Petitioner/Appellant's Opening Brief. These derogatory references are 
improper, unsupported and unsupportable, and far beyond the limits of decorum established 
by applicable standards. As a result, Petitioner's briefs should be disregarded or stricken by 
the Court, and attorneys' fees should be assessed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DESERET DIVERSIFIED DEVELOPMENT HAD THE AUTHORITY 
TO IMPOSE BINDING COVENANTS, CONDITIONS AND 
RESTRICTIONS ON THE PROPERTY IT WAS DEVELOPING. 
The pervasive role of Brent Jensen and his companies, including Deseret, in the 
development of the Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow Ranch subdivisions is obvious from 
recorded documents that establish and govern the subdivisions. Though the documents may 
be less than elegant by today's title standards,5 they describe an incontestable course of a 
phased development, with Security Title holding legal title, while Jensen's interests, holding 
beneficial title, acted as the developer of the various phases. Jensen, through successive 
5
 The Court of Appeals suggested that Jensen's approach to documentation was 
"cavalier." Opinion, f 29. 
12 
entities that apparently reflected different investor groups, recorded covenants, prepared and 
recorded plats, constructed roads and a water system, and sold and conveyed lots. While the 
original records that described the relationship between Security Title and the Jensen 
interests are no longer available, the object and result of this collaborative effort are readily 
apparent in the 800-lot community they created. 
That Jensen acted with authority and the acquiescence of Security Title is conclusively 
confirmed by the joinder of Security Title with Deseret in executing Plat D as owners and 
by Security Title's subsequent conveyance of the lots (including Lot 105) subject to the 
restrictions and reservations that have been of record for 30 years. (Opinion, f^ 6.) For these 
and other reasons, the trial court and the Court of Appeals reached the correct result, and they 
did so on alternative bases.6 
Petitioner persists in its attacks on the CC&Rs by self-defining a number of 
incongruous legal pigeonholes, and then complaining that it cannot fit this fact situation 
neatly within them. Petitioner posits a number of hypothetical issues, but cannot reconcile 
them with the phased development of real property in which a watchful trustee took an active 
and approving role. The difficulty with Petitioner's position lies not with the underlying 
6
 The Court of Appeals, for instance, did not disturb the Trial Court's findings 
that Petitioner's challenge to the CC&Rs is untimely, and it would be inequitable for 
Petitioner to avoid compliance with the CC&Rs where it took with notice of them and enjoys 
the benefits provided by the Association. (R. 00380 - 381; 00494.) These points are not 
embraced in the issue as to which certiorari was granted and will not be further addressed 
herein. 
13 
facts but with the impractical and hypertechnical legal analysis it attempts to employ. 
Petitioner's lengthy parade of parentheticals and hypothetical horribles ignore both history 
and logic, and demonstrate a refusal to recognize the fundamental fact that this land was 
developed by Jensen and his companies, including Deseret. Simply put, had Jensen and 
Deseret not had the authority to develop Forest Meadow Plat D, Lot 105 would not exist. In 
other words, Petitioner acquired its land, and therefore its standing herein, only by virtue of 
the acts of the very developer whose authority it now challenges. The illogic of its position 
doomed Petitioner's effort before the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals, and Petitioner 
will not be able to escape it here. 
A. Deseret's Authority to Impose the CC&Rs is Confirmed by the 
Records Furnished by Petitioner, 
The facts material to this action are nol in dispute. The parties acknowledged both 
that the recorded documents placed before the Trial Court were accurate copies and that they 
comprise all of the relevant, recorded documents. Both parties urged the Trial Court to 
resolve the case by Summary Judgment. Those records stand as ample evidence of Deseret's 
authority on two separate bases: (1) they establish time-honored presumptions of authority 
that Petitioner has not, and cannot, rebut; and (2) they stand separately as evidence of that 
authority and of the pattern of the development process followed by Deseret and Security 
Title. 
Precisely to address situations where a party may seek to challenge documents long 
after memories have faded and evidence has been lost, Utah law establishes a specific 
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statutory presumption that "recitals and other statements of fact in a [recorded] document 
. . . are true." Utah Code Ann. § 57-4a-4(l)(j) (2000). A recital by definition is "[a] 
preliminary statement in a contract or deed explaining the background of the transaction or 
showing the existence of particular facts." Black's Law Dictionary 1276 (7th ed. 1999). 
When recitals and other statements of fact are included in a recorded document, the 
presumption of their truth "may only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence." 
Jacobs v. Hafen, 875 P.2d 559, 561 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (concerning the presumption in 
section 57-4a-4 (l)(j) that delivery of a deed occurred notwithstanding any lapse of time 
between the date on the document and the date of recording).7 
The CC&Rs recite that Deseret was the "owner" of "the South half of Section 22, 
Township 1 North, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, which will consist of all the 
lots of the Forest Meadow Ranch subdivisions within this area," (R. 00475-78), a portion of 
which ultimately became Lot 105A. The CC&Rs were signed by W. Brent Jensen, as 
President of Deseret. Id. By statutory presumption, this statement in the recorded CC&Rs 
establishes that Deseret Development had an ownership interest in the property at the time 
the 1997 CC&Rs were recorded. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-4a-4(l)(j) (2000). Petitioner 
offered no contrary evidence. 
7
 Forest Meadow's argument that the CC&Rs are invalid under the Utah 
general law of trusts because the beneficiary of a trust does not have the power to encumber 
specific properties held by the trustee in trust are addressed below. 
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The CC&Rs further state that "the reservations and restrictive covenants herein set 
out are to run with the land and shall be binding upon all persons owning or occupying any 
lot. . . ." (R. 00475-78). The neighboring Pine Meadow CC&Rs similarly provided that "all 
of the properties . . . . shall be held, sold and conveyed subject to the following easements, 
restrictions, covenants, and conditions, which are for the purpose of protecting the value and 
desirability of, which shall run with, the real property." (R. 00181-90). This pattern was 
followed by Deseret and its successors in the development of the multiple plats that created 
the 800 Forest Meadow and Pine Meadow lots that are members of the Association. The 
intent and effect of the declarations is evident both in their language and their effect. In fact, 
the lands were subdivided and sold, and have at all times been governed by the CC&Rs. 
That the stated goal of protecting the value and desirability of the lands subject thereto has 
been met is presumably evidenced by the fact that Petitioner was attracted to the area. 
B. Deseret's Actions Were Consistent With Its Beneficial Interest 
Covenants affecting land may be imposed by a person or entity authorized to do so. 
That authority may be based in an ownership consistent with the interest expressed in the 
covenants. This Court, in Flying Diamond Oil Corporation v. Newton Sheep Company, 776 
P.2d 618,629 (Utah 1989) confirmed that covenants which run with the land "must be based 
in some interest in land." (Emphasis added.) The precise nature of the interest upon which 
such covenants must be based was not specified. Rather, the Court held: "[T]o touch and 
concern the land, a covenant must bear upon the use and enjoyment of the land and be of the 
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kind that the owner of a estate or interest in land may make because of his ownership right." 
Id., at 623 (citations omitted). Deseret possessed such an ownership right. 
The nature of the relationship between Security Title, the legal title owner, and 
Deseret, the beneficial title holder, is easily inferred. The recitals in the record documents, 
and the phased development of the Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow subdivisions, amply 
confirm Deseret's role as developer of Forest Meadow Plat D. Its beneficial interest in the 
land was that of a developer with the right to develop the land subject to the ultimate 
satisfaction of the financial or other requirements imposed upon the trustee by the trustor. 
This was the obvious nature and purpose of Deseret's beneficial interest in the land. We 
need not speculate or indulge in hypothetical about what Deseret might have done with the 
land because we know the course of its development activities. Deseret's course of 
development is evident in the records of the Summit County Recorder and in the large, 
contiguous community of subdivisions it left behind. No less evident is the fact that Security 
Title, as Trustee, acknowledged and confirmed the authority of the beneficial title holder by 
joining in the platting of the land with knowledge of the CC&Rs previously recorded by 
Deseret, and by Security Title's subsequent conveyance of the platted lots subject to the 
CC&Rs. 
This history is made plain by the detail of the uncontroverted evidence furnished to 
the Trial Court. As noted above, Lot 105 A was created by the plat that established Plat D 
of the Forest Meadow Ranch subdivision. (R. 00135). Forest Meadow Ranch Plat D, which 
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was recorded with the Summit County Recorder on May 6, 1976, clearly recites that the 
"owners" of the property were Deseret and Security Title. The Owners' Declaration 
indicates, in relevant part: 
Know all men by these presents that we, the four undersigned 
owners of the above described tract of land, having caused the 
same to be subdivided into lots & streets hereafter to be known 
as: FOREST MEADOW RANCH, PLAT UD" do hereby 
dedicate for perpetual use of the public all parcels of land shown 
on this plat as intended for public use. 
(R. 00135). The plat was then signed by Deseret (by W. Brent Jensen, President, and Lee 
Ann Hunter, Secretary), and by Security Title Company as Trustee, all as owners. 
(R. 00135). 
The Subdivider's Note, also contained on the recorded Plat D, provides additional 
evidence that Deseret was the beneficial owner of the property being subdivided. The note 
reads: 
The recording of this plat shall not constitute a dedication of the 
roads and streets or rights of way to public use. It is intended 
that all streets shown hereon shall remain the property of the 
subdivider, Deseret Diversified Development, Inc.—and shall 
be completely maintained by said owners. 
(R. 00135). The Surveyor's Certificate provides additional evidence and proof that Deseret 
was an owner at the time Plat D was recorded. This certification provides, in relevant part, 
"I, Lynn D. Gottfredsen, do hereby certify . . . that I have, by authority of the owners, 
subdivided the tract of land shown on this plat & described below into lots & streets (private 
roads), to be hereafter known as FOREST MEADOW RANCH, PLAT 'D. '" (R. 00135). 
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Security Title, as Trustee, by its signature clearly agreed with and ratified the recital of 
Deseret's ownership interest. 
This evidence is consistent with the import of the presumption, under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 57-4a-4(i)(j), that Security Title held legal title as a "Trustee" on behalf of its principal and 
that the beneficial title holder was Deseret - the party that signed and recorded the 1971 
CC&Rs. (R. 00135). Utah Law is clear to the effect that: 
There is a significant difference between the type of bare legal 
title possessed by an agent or trustee and the beneficial 
interest. . . . Agents and trustees have no direct beneficial 
interest in the property to which they hold title. Their title is 
held purely for the benefit of another. 
Capital Assets Fin. Serv. v. Maxwell, 2000 UT 9, ^  17, 994 P.2d 201.8 
No evidence suggests other than that Deseret was the beneficial owner of the property 
8
 Petitioner complains about the Court of Appeals' analysis of Capital Assets. 
At page 21 of its Opening Brief, Petitioner claims, "No reasonable person could have drawn 
the Court of Appeal's [sic] holding from the actual holding of this Court. It is beyond the 
range of 'innocent mistake' or even 'negligent mistake.'" In other words, Petitioner accuses 
the Court of Appeals of making a deliberate misstatement, of intentionally violating the Code 
of Judicial Conduct. The accusation is unfounded and scandalous. 
While the Court may have been more explicit in the parenthetical explanation 
of the import of Capital Assets in the citation at f 36 of its opinion, Capital Assets does 
support the general conclusion for which it was cited. In discussing the purposes of the 
judgment lien statute in Capital Assets, this Court stated, "a judgment lien attaches to a 
debtor's beneficial and equitable property interests, even if the debtor has no record title." 
Capital Assets, 2000 UT 9 at f 15 (citations omitted.) Indeed, "a judgment lien will n ot 
attach to a debtor's 'bare legal title' in property because such a debtor holds no equitable or 
beneficial interest in the land." Id. Here, and under the authorities cited in the next 
argument, a beneficial title holder may indeed encumber its interest in the property. 
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that ultimately became Lot 105A at the time the CC&Rs were recorded. Petitioner 
acknowledges that "the uniform practice is not to record the trust instrument" (Opening 
Brief, p. 24) and then complains that it is not able to locate a copy three or four decades later. 
Petitioner here acknowledges that it cannot meet its burden of overcoming the presumption 
that the statements in the CC&Rs are true. Petitioner also tacitly acknowledges something 
more significant: that none challenged the authority of Deseret to record the CC&Rs at the 
time the property was being developed. Petitioner has offered no evidence to suggest that 
the trustor or the trustee challenged or in any way disagreed with the recording of the CC&Rs 
by Deseret, or with Deseret's authority to do so. To the contrary, Security Title joined in the 
platting of the property and subsequently conveyed title to the lots created by Deseret. The 
trustor, presumably, accepted payment for the land and vanished from the record. 
The Court of Appeals found that all traditional requirements of privity necessary for 
the enforcement of the CC&Rs exist in this case. Opinion, f 35.9 This analysis is instructive, 
because the same elements that established privity are those that confirm Deseret5s authority 
to develop the property and to record the CC&Rs. Beyond that, however, "substance should 
9
 The trial court held consistently and stated in the alternative, "even if there was 
no vertical privity, as a matter of equity, the court agrees with [the Association] that prior 
predecessors in interest have treated the covenants as covenants that run with the land and 
so must [Petitioner]. A challenge to these covenants over thirty years later is untimely and 
must be barred." (R. 00380). Clearly, in Utah, a party must prevail in claims on the strength 
of his own title and not on the weakness of another. See, e.g., Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, 
Inc., 87 P.3d 734,790 (Utah App. 2004). Again, there are not competing chains of title here. 
All agree that Petitioner owns Lot 105A. The only question is whether Petitioner is bound 
by the CC&Rs recorded against it. 
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prevail over technical form so that a homeowner's association which had no interest in the 
property at all could sue to enforce a covenant." Flying Diamond Oil Corporation, 776 P.2d 
at 628 n. 13 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted). 
II. TO THE EXTENT THE TRUST AND OTHER ISSUES BRIEFED 
BY PETITIONER ARE FAIRLY ENCOMPASSED WITHIN THE 
SINGLE ISSUE AS TO WHICH THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
WAS GRANTED, THEY DO NOT REQUIRE A DIFFERENT 
RESULT THAN THAT REACHED BY THE LOWER COURTS. 
Petitioner's primary "pigeonhole," its response to the issue as posited in the writ of 
certiorari, is to challenge the existence *of the trust, assume that it had "spendthrift" 
limitations, and then dispute the authority of those who acted for it. (Opening Brief, 
argument 4.) However, the issue the parties were directed to brief assume the existence of 
the trust described by the Court of Appeals, and that Deseret held a beneficial interest 
thereunder. Petitioner's arguments disputing the existence of a trust are thus not properly 
before the Court. "Review on certiorari is limited to examining the court of appeals' decision 
and is further circumscribed by the issues raised in the petitions." Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. 
Russell, 966 P.2d 852, 856 (Utah 1998). "Only questions set forth in the petition or fairly 
included therein will be considered by the Supreme Court." Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4). "This 
Court's grant of a petition of certiorari does not allow a second plenary appeal." Debry v. 
Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 443 (Utah 1995). "Issues not presented in the petition for certiorari, 
or if presented, not included in the order granting certiorari and fairly encompassed within 
such issues, are not properly before the court on the merits." Id. (Emphasis added.) 
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As the issue framed by the Court presupposes the existence of the trust, the focus of 
argument must be on whether the rights and powers of a trust beneficiary may include the 
authority to impose binding CC&Rs on trust property. Petitioner is precluded from calling 
into question the existence of a trust. 
Assuming that Petitioner's arguments are properly before the Court, the Association 
notes that Deseret never purported to convey fee title to the land subject to the trust. It did 
not create a competing chain of title and the Association acknowledges Petitioner's title to 
Lot 105 A. Title to the trust res, in other words, remained with Security Title as Trustee until 
the land had been platted and Security Title was in a position to convey the individual lots 
developed by Deseret and Security. 
Petitioner argues that, as beneficial owner, Deseret had no power of disposition. 
(Opening Brief, p. 17.) Petitioner makes that statement with no knowledge of the terms of 
the trust and in disregard of Deseret's obvious role as developer of the property. As noted 
above, trustees hold title for the benefit of others. They have no beneficial interest. The 
beneficial ownership of the property in question here, both in fact and under the issue stated 
by the Court, was held by Deseret. Petitioner argues that, as beneficial owner, Deseret had 
no power to act with regard to the property. Petitioner is wrong. 
As a general rule, "the beneficiary of a trust has the power to transfer his interest." 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 132 (1959). This rule "is applicable to transfers of a part 
of the beneficiary's interest as well as to transfers of the whole of his interest." Id. § 132 
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cmt. c; see generally George G. Bogert et al., The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 188 (Rev. 2d 
ed., 2005) ("In the absence of provisions in the trust instrument or a statute to the contrary, 
the beneficiary may alienate his interest as freely as he might a legal estate or interest." 
(footnotes omitted)), and the cases cited therein. Furthermore, "the interest of the 
beneficiary may also be devised, mortgaged, or encumbered." Bogert, The Law of Trusts and 
Trustees at § 188 (footnotes omitted). 
This principle was recognized in the early Utah case, Cronquist v. Utah State Agr. 
College, 114 Utah 426, 201 P.2d 280 (1949): 
"According to the great weight of authority, . . . where the 
instrument creating the trust contains no express words of 
restraint and nothing in (sic) on its face declaring that the 
purpose thereof is to provide a support for the beneficiary and 
to furnish him with the comforts of life, and where it requires 
that the revenue arising from such trust shall be paid directly to 
the beneficiary without any direction concerning its application 
and without any discretion being vested in the trustee as to the 
time or amount of such payments or the purpose to which they 
shall be applied, such revenue may be anticipated, or assigned 
by the beneficiary or by proper proceedings subjected to the 
payment of his debts." 
Id at 284 (alterations in original) (quoting Nunn v. Titche-Goettinger Co., 245 S.W.421,422 
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1922)). 
The general right of the beneficiary to alienate its interest in the trust res is 
reaffirmed by the Utah Uniform Trust Code (the Trust Code).10 See Utah Code Ann. 
10
 The Trust Code is relevant to the trust in the present case. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 75-7-1103(l)(a) ("Except as otherwise provided, this chapter applies to: (a) all trusts 
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§§ 75-7-101 to -1201 (Supp. 2005). For example, the Trust Code defines "[bjeneficiary" as 
a person that "has a present or future beneficial interest in a trust, vested or contingent"; or 
"in a capacity other than that of trustee, holds a power of appointment over trust property." 
Id. § 75-7-103(b). "[P]ower of appointment" is not defined by the Trust Code. However, 
the phrase has a long history at common law where it has been stated that "the essence of 
such a power is that it gives to the donee the power to cause some person to receive less of 
the subject property and another person to receive more." In re Estate of Lewis, 738 P.2d 
617, 619 (Utah 1987); see generally 62 Am. Jur. 2d Powers of Appointment, Etc. § 2 (2005) 
("The power of appointment has been defined simply as the power to dispose of 
property . . . ."). While a power of appointment may not be directly involved here, by 
defining a "beneficiary" as one who "holds a power of appointment," the legislature 
implicitly acknowledged a trust beneficiary's general power to dispose of its beneficial 
interest in the trust res. 
In exception to the general rule, the trust instrument may limit the beneficiary's power 
of transfer, generally through a "spendthrift provision,"11 but the intent to restrain the 
created before, on, or after July 1, 2004 . . . ."). 
11
 For an example of a spendthrift provision, see In re Estate of Grimm, 784 P.2d 
1238, 1244 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("Both wills contained the following spendthrift clause: 
No beneficiary of my estate shall have any right to alienate, encumber, or hypothecate his or 
her interest in said estate or the income therefrom, nor shall such interest of any beneficiary 
be subject to claims of his or her creditors or liable to attachment, execution, or other process 
of law."). 
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beneficiary's power of transfer must be clearly shown.12 See Cronquist, 201 P.2d at 283. 
In the present case, there is no indication that the trust was subject to a spendthrift provision 
or other restraint on the beneficiary.13 Accordingly, because such a restraint must clearly be 
shown, see, Cronquist, 201 P.2d at 283, Deseret had a general power of disposition of its 
beneficial interest. 
Cronquist is also instructive as to the extent Utah law permits a beneficiary to alienate 
its beneficial interest. In Cronquist, the trustor died testate in 1927, leaving a substantial 
estate in real and personal property, some of which, including College Farm, "was by the 
terms of the will left to the Cache Valley Bank Company as trustee, to hold in trust for twenty 
years." Id, at 281. The beneficiaries of the trust were the trustor's three children, one of 
whom was the plaintiff to the instant action. Id. On November 9, 1944, "before the 
termination of the trust estate," Id. at 282, the plaintiff entered into an agreement with Utah 
State Agricultural College (the college), whereby the plaintiff agreed to sell to the college 
his "undivided one-third interest in the College farm, for $10,000, and at the same time [the] 
plaintiff[] executed a quitclaim deed to the land." Id. at 282. The deed was deposited with 
12
 Similar restraints include a "discretionary trust," which places distribution at 
the discretion of the trustee, see Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-504 (Supp. 2005), or a trust for 
support or maintenance. 
13
 Indeed, such restraints may not have been valid at the time this trust was 
executed and wholly operated. Although generally discussing spendthrift trusts, the 
Cronquist Court refused to recognize their validity. See Cronquist v. Utah State Agr. 
College, 114 Utah 426, 201 P.2d 280 (1949) ("This opinion is not to be construed as a 
holding by implication that spendthrift trusts are valid in Utah to any extent. As to that 
question we express no opinion.") 
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the trustee, for delivery to the college "upon approval of the agreement by [the college's] 
Board of Trustees." Id. The quitclaim deed was later delivered to the college, and recorded 
on November 20, 1944. The trustee continued to hold the land in trust until the trust was 
terminated in 1947 (at the end of the twenty-year trust period) "and the trust assets [were] 
conveyed to the beneficiaries." Id. 
The plaintiff commenced suit "to have [his] contract with, and deed to [the college] 
declared null and void." Id. The college counterclaimed "for specific performance of the 
contract and that title to an undivided one-third of the lands in question be quieted to it." Id. 
The district court ruled against the plaintiff and in favor of the college See id. 
On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the trust was a spendthrift trust, and that 
therefore the plaintiff could not "anticipate his interest therein, nor could he alienate it in the 
fashion attempted to be done here." The college, for its part, insisted that the trust was not 
a spendthrift trust, "and that the contract and deed executed by [the] plaintiff[] are in all 
respects binding. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court quieting 
title to the property in the college. Id. at 285. 
This reasoning is applicable here, which involves a trust similarly free from restraint. 
The Court of Appeals confirmed that the CC&Rs are covenants that run with the land. See, 
Forest Meadow Ranch Prop. Owners Ass 'n, L.L.C. v. Pine Meadow Ranch Home Ass 'n, 
2005 UT App 294,T|39, 118 P.3d 871. It does not follow, however, that imposition of 
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CC&Rs, which are in the nature of a contract between future owners of the land, is an 
alienation of the fee title to the land. 
CC&Rs act as a contract established by a prior owner that affects property and is 
construed under principles of contract law: 
Restrictive covenants that run with the land and encumber 
subdivision lots form a contract between subdivision property 
owners as a whole and individual lot owners; therefore, 
interpretation of the covenants is governed by the same rules of 
construction as those used to interpret contracts. 
Swenson v. Erickson, 998 P.2d 807, 810-11 (Utah 2000) (citing 20 Am. Jur. 2d Covenants 
§170 (1995)) (additional citations omitted) See also Holladay Duplex Management 
Company, L.L.C., v. Howells, 47 P.3d 104, 105-106 (Utah App. 2002) (noting deeds and 
restrictive covenants are interpreted in the same manner as contracts); Canyon Meadows 
Home Owners Association v. Wasatch County, 40 P.3d 1148,1151 (Utah App. 2001) (same). 
As noted above, the CC&Rs must "be of the kind that the owner of an estate or interest in 
land may make because of his ownership right." Flying Diamond, 776 P.2d at 623. Since 
the nature and purpose of Deseret's beneficial interest was that of a developer, the imposition 
of CC&Rs and the platting of the land was entirely consistent with its interest in the trust. 
Even if the imposition of CC&Rs could be deemed an alienation of an interest in the trust 
property, it was a far more modest alienation than that involved in Cronquist, where the 
beneficial owner was permitted to quitclaim his one-third interest in College Farm prior to 
the termination of the trust. 
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There is further authority for the right of a beneficial owner to alienate or otherwise 
affect its interest in trust property. Absent a spendthrift provision, creditors and assignees 
of the beneficiary enjoy a general right to attach or encumber the beneficiary's interest in the 
trust res. See Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-501 (Supp. 2005). In fact, the law considers the 
authority of a creditor of the beneficiary to involuntarily encumber the beneficiary's interest 
equal to the beneficiary's own authority to voluntarily encumber or alienate that interest. See 
id. § 75-7-502 (making a spendthrift provision preventing transfer valid only "if it restrains 
both voluntary and involuntary transfer of a beneficiary's interest."). Given this equality of 
rights, it would seem to make little sense to hold that a beneficiary's creditor may encumber 
the beneficiary's interest in the trust, whereas the beneficiary could not. 
Petitioner recognizes that "trust beneficiaries of non-spendthrift trusts have authority 
to dispose of their interests in the trusts," but contends that this is "not the power to dispose 
of trust property." (Opening Brief, p. 18.) In support of this claim, Petitioner cites (without 
explanation or quote) George T. Bogert, Trusts 132-42(6th ed. 1987). However, this 
statement is not clearly supported by Bogert. In fact, in his treatise, Bogert states: "The rules 
of construction with regard to equitable estates are generally the same as those regarding 
corresponding legal interests, and the beneficiary of a trust will normally take an equitable 
estate having rights and incidents similar to one owning a corresponding legal estate." 
George G. Bogert et al., The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 182 (Rev. 2d ed., 2005). This 
reasoning comports with the action taken by the Utah Supreme Court in Cronquist, wherein 
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the court permitted the beneficiary to convey, by quitclaim deed, his interest in College Farm. 
See Cronquist v. Utah State Agr. College, 201 P.2d at 282, 285. 
Petitioner also argues that the beneficiary has no power of disposition because the 
"long established rule" in both Utah and the United States at large, is that "the trustee has 
exclusive control over trust property subject only to the limitations imposed by law or the 
trust instrument." (Opening Brief, pp. 16-17.) In support, Petitioner cites In re Estate of 
Flake, 2003 UT 17,112, 71 P.3d 589; Matter of Estate of West, 948 P.2d 351, 354 (Utah 
1997); and Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Country Club Mobile Estates, Ltd., 632 P.2d 869 
(Utah 1981). However, Petitioner quotes only a part of the rule in his brief. The actual rule 
from these cases states that the trustee has: 
exclusive control of the trust property, subject only to the 
limitations imposed by law or the trust instrument, and "once a 
settlor has created the trust he is no longer the owner of the trust 
property and has only such ability to deal with it as is expressly 
reserved to him in the trust instrument." 
Estate of Flake, 2003 UT 17 atf 12 (quoting Continental Bank & Trust Co., 632 P.2d at 872). 
When the entire rule as stated in these cases is considered, it becomes clear that the 
exclusivity of control bestowed upon the trustee is vis-a-vis the settlor, and not the 
beneficiary. Indeed, none of the cases cited by Petitioner involve disputes over a 
beneficiary's disposition of property. Rather, Continental Bank involved the settlor's 
disposition of trust property, see Continental Bank & Trust Co., 632 P.2d at 872; Flake 
concerned the revocation and modification of a trust, see Estate of Flake, 2003 UT 17 at ffl[ 9, 
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13-22; and West involved a challenge by children, as contingent beneficiaries of a revocable 
intervivos trust, to their father's power "either as sole trustee or surviving settlor . . . to 
convey the property out of the trust to himself and his wife Marilyn West after his first wife 
Hazel West [the children's mother] died." Matter of Estate of West, 948 P.2d at 352, 353. 
The present case, by contrast, involves the active beneficiary of a trust. In such cases, as 
noted, the general rule is that such a beneficiary can dispose of and encumber his beneficial 
interest in the trust res. See Cronquist, 201 P.2d at 282, 285. 
III. PETITIONER'S CRITICISM OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS 
SCANDALOUS AND UNJUST. AS A RESULT OF THESE ATTACKS 
ON THE INTEGRITY OF THE COURT, PETITIONER'S BRIEF MAY 
APPROPRIATELY BE STRICKEN AND ATTORNEYS' FEES 
SHOULD BE ASSESSED. 
In the six years since Petitioner filed this action, it has availed itself of the benefits of 
Association membership, while variously blaming the Association, its counsel and the Courts 
for the continuing existence of the Association and community attributes it represents. The 
pursuit of its claims to an expense and extent entirely disproportionate to their import may 
be Petitioner's right, but even that right must be exercised within established bounds of 
civility and decorum. "Derogatory references to others or inappropriate language of any kind 
has no place in an appellate brief and is of no assistance to this Court in attempling to resolve 
any legitimate issues presented on appeal." State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296 (Utah 1986); see 
also Advanced Restoration, LLC v. Priskos, 2005 UT App 505 n. 13. This caution was 
issued in a case involving a pro se defendant; it applies with much greater force to a 
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defendant represented by an experienced attorney and instructor of attorneys. Rule 24(j) of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires briefs filed in this Court to be free from 
scandalous matters and provides that briefs containing such materials may be disregarded or 
stricken. 
Throughout this litigation, Petitioner has refused to acknowledge the possibility that 
it might be mistaken, and that the development process that created Lot 105 A also resulted 
in the creation of a community association of which Petitioner is a member. Petitioner has 
instead persistently blamed others for the fact it has not prevailed. At various stages of this 
action, it has accused opposing counsel of bad faith and challenged the standing of the 
Association to defend itself against Petitioner's claims. Thus far, the Association has chosen 
to ignore these insinuations and has attempted to focus instead on the relevant facts and law. 
The Association still believes that the proper focus herein should be on the merits of 
the dispute. However, the derogatory and baseless charges of intentional judicial misconduct 
made in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari and in the Petitioner/Appellant's Opening Brief 
are so scandalous and inappropriate that, consistent with the admonition in the comment to 
Rule 8.2 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct to defend judges and courts unjustly 
criticized, the Association feels constrained to object and bring them to the attention of this 
Court.14 
14
 The charges appear to arise from a factual misstatement by the Court of 
Appeals when it stated that the Forest Meadow Plat D plat had been signed on behalf of 
Security Title by W. Brent Jensen rather than by Leo D. Jensen. (Opinion, n. 2 and f^ 30). 
That error was the stated basis for a Petition for Rehearing which was denied not because of 
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Petitioner's repeated criticism of the Utah Court of Appeals and, in particular, Judge 
Greenwood, is offensive and inappropriate. In particular, the Association directs the Court's 
attention to the hostile and demeaning tenor of the pointed accusation that Judge Greenwood 
intentionally fabricated evidence to establish factual support for a pre-conceived result. This 
and other wholly unsupported charges of bias, prejudice, and intentional misconduct (i.e., 
"This was no innocent mistake") are made at pages 5-8 of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
The charges are again sarcastically invoked at pp. 16-17 of the Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari. 
Petitioner did not exhaust its emotion with the Petition for Writ of Certiorari. At 
pages 21 - 22 of Petitioner/Appellant's Opening Brief, Petitioner renewed its attack. 
Referencing the import of Capital Assets discussed in footnote 7, above, Petitioner 
sarcastically accused the Court of Appeals of intentionally misstating the holding of that 
case.15 
These public attacks on the integrity of the Court of Appeals and, in particular, Judge 
Greenwood, are baseless and inappropriate. They are made in violation of Rule 8.2 (a) of 
the Rules of Professional Conduct, which prohibits false or reckless public statements 
bias or corruption, as argued by Petitioner, but because the misstated fact was obviously 
immaterial to the Court's decision. 
15
 "No reasonable person could have drawn the Court of Appeals' holding from 
the actual holding of this Court. It is beyond the range of 'innocent mistake' or even 
'negligent mistake.' The truth is sometimes a matter of degree - as when the defendant 
claimed he didn't know the revolver was loaded when he accidentally shot his wife - six 
times." Opening Brief at 21. 
32 
concerning the integrity of a judge, and they certainly violate Standards 1 and 3 of the 
Standards of Professionalism and Civility. These requirements are consistent with a lawyer's 
obligations under Rule 3.5 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct and its interpreting 
comment. Hostile and derogatory references are simply not appropriate. See Cook; 
Advanced Restoration, L.L.C. v. Priskos, 126 P.3d 786 , 2005 UT App 505, fn 13. 
Petitioner's Briefs violate Rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure to 
such a clear extent that they should not be considered by the Court and attorneys' fees should 
be assessed. 
CONCLUSION 
Deseret had the authority to impose binding covenants, conditions and restrictions on 
the lands of its phased development. Its authority to so act within its beneficial interest as 
developer of the property is confirmed by the recitals in the recorded documents, by the 
confirming and ratifying conduct of Security Title, Trustee, by the lack of objection by the 
trustor and any of the other owners of lots in the community it developed over a 30-year 
period, and by the authorities generally permitting a beneficiary to alienate or encumber its 
beneficial interest in a trust. Petitioner acquired title to a lot created by Deseret and cannot 
now complain that Deseret lacked authority to develop the lot. The Opinion of the Utah 
Court of Appeals should therefore be affirmed. 
33 
In addition, Petitioner's briefs should be disregarded or stricken by the Court because 
they contain derogatory and scandalous accusations of judicial misconduct not supported in 
this record. Attorneys' fees should therefore be assessed against Petitioner. 
Respectfully submitted this 14th day of February 2006. 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
< g ? £ 7 ^ 
EDWIN C. BARNES 
WALTER A. ROMNEY, JR. 
Attorneys for Respondent /Appellee 
Pine Meadow Ranch Home Owners Association 
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VVestlaw 
UT ST § 57-3-102 Page 1 
U.C.A. 1953 § 57-3-102 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 57. Real Estate 
*ii Chapter 3. Recording of Documents 
*S Part 1. General Provisions 
•*§ 57-3-102. Record imparts notice—Change in interest rate—Validity of 
document—Notice of unnamed interests—Conveyance by grantee 
(1) Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified, in the manner prescribed 
by this title, each original document or certified copy of a document complying 
with Section 57-4a-3, whether or not acknowledged, each copy of a notice of 
location complying with Section 40-1-4, and each financing statement complying 
with Section 70A-9a-502, whether or not acknowledged shall, from the time of 
recording with the appropriate county recorder, impart notice to all persons of 
their contents. 
(2) If a recorded document was given as security, a change in the interest rate in 
accordance with the terms of an agreement pertaining to the underlying secured 
obligation does not affect the notice or alter the priority of the document 
provided under Subsection (1). 
(3) This section does not affect the validity of a document with respect to the 
parties to the document and all other persons who have notice of the document. 
(4) The fact that a recorded document recites only a nominal consideration, names 
the grantee as trustee, or otherwise purports to be in trust without naming 
beneficiaries or stating the terms of the trust does not charge any third person 
with notice of any interest of the grantor or of the interest of any other person 
not named in the document. 
(5) The grantee in a recorded document may convey the interest granted to him free 
and clear of all claims not disclosed in the document in which he appears as 
grantee or in any other document recorded in accordance with this title that sets 
forth the names of the beneficiaries, specifies the interest claimed, and 
describes the real property subject to the interest. 
Laws 1977, c. 272, § 54; Laws 1985, c. 159, § 7; Laws 1988, c. 155, § 14; Laws 
1989, c. 88, § 8; Laws 1998, c. 61, § 2, eff. July 1, 1998; Laws 1998, c. 85, § 
4, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 2000, c. 252, § 11, eff. July 1, 2001. 
Codifications R.S. 1898, § 2000; C.L. 1907, § 2000; C.L. 1917, § 4900; R.S. 
1933, § 78-3-2; C. 1943, § 78-3-2; C. 1953, § 57-3-2. 
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UT ST § 5 7 - 4 a - 4 Page 1 
U.C.A. 1953 § 5 7 - 4 a - 4 
c 
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
TITLE 57. REAL ESTATE 
Title 57. Real Estate 
CHAPTER 4A. EFFECTS OF RECORDING 
Chapter 4A. Effects of Recording 
-•§ 57-4a-4. Presumptions 
(1) A recorded document creates the following presumptions regarding title to the 
real property affected: 
(a) the document is genuine and was executed voluntarily by the person purporting 
to execute it; 
(b) the person executing the document and the person on whose behalf it is 
executed are the persons they purport to be; 
(c) the person executing the document was neither incompetent nor a minor at any 
relevant time; 
(d) delivery occurred notwithstanding any lapse of time between dates on the 
document and the date of recording; 
(e) any necessary consideration was given; 
(f) the grantee, transferee, or beneficiary of an interest created or described 
by the document acted in good faith at all relevant times; 
(g) a person executing a document as an agent, attorney in fact, officer of an 
organization, or in a fiduciary or official capacity: 
(i) held the position he purported to hold and acted within the scope of his 
authority; 
(ii) in the case of an officer of an organization, was authorized under all 
applicable laws to act on behalf of the organization; and 
(iii) in the case of an agent, his agency was not revoked, and he acted for a 
principal who was neither incompetent nor a minor at any relevant time; 
(h) a person executing the document as an individual: 
(i) was unmarried on the effective date of the document; or 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
UT ST § 57-4a-4 Page 2 
U.C.A. 1953 § 57-4a-4 
(ii) if it otherwise appears from the document that the person was married on 
the effective date of the document, the grantee was a bona fide purchaser and 
the grantor received adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth 
so that the joinder of the nonexecuting spouse was not required under Sections 
75-2-201 through 75-2-207; 
(i) if the document purports to be executed pursuant to or to be a final 
determination in a judicial or administrative proceeding, or to be executed 
pursuant to a power of eminent domain, the court, official body, or condemnor 
acted within its jurisdiction and all steps required for the execution of the 
document were taken; and 
(j) recitals and other statements of fact in a document, including without 
limitation recitals concerning mergers or name changes of organizations, are true. 
(2) The presumptions stated in Subsection (1) arise even though the document 
purports only to release a claim or to convey any right, title, or interest of the 
person executing it or the person on whose behalf it is executed. 
Laws 1988, c. 155, § 22; Laws 1989, c. 88, § 11. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 57-4a-4, UT ST § 57-4a-4 
Current through end of 2005 First Special Session 
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